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  1OPTIMAL CROP-INSURANCE STRATEGIES UNDER CLIMATE VARIABILITY:  
CONTRASTING INSURER AND FARMER INTERESTS 
 
Víctor E. Cabrera, Daniel Solís and David Letson 
 
Abstract: This study analyzes the potential synergies and conflicts of interest 
between farmers and insurers in the selection of an optimal crop insurance 
contract. Special attention is given to how climate information influences this 
decision-making process. To do so, we consider a representative 40 hectares, 
rainfed, cotton-peanut farm located in Jackson County in Florida. Our results 
show that year-to-year ENSO-based climate variability affects farmers’ income 
and insurers’ gains according to crop insurance contracts. Additionally, 
introduction of ENSO-based climate forecasts presents a significant impact on the 
selection of a particular contract. We conclude that insurers and farmers can 
bridge their divergent interests by improving their understanding of the effect of 
climate conditions on the development of sustainable business plans.  
 




Climatic variability significantly affects agricultural production, profitability and risk 
(Mendelsohn, Dinar and Williams, 2006; Chen and Chang, 2005). Predictability of seasonal 
climate variations can help in reducing farm risk by tailoring agricultural management strategies 
to mitigate the impacts of adverse conditions or to take advantage of favorable conditions (Letson 
et al., 2005; Mjelde, Thompson and Nixon, 1996). Recently, researchers and policy makers have 
tried to coordinate strategies for risk management by expanding the variety of crop insurance 
products and by communicating usable and timely climate forecast information (Cabrera et al., 
2006). Crop insurance offers farmers economic stability under the uncertainty of future random 
events, including climate (Mahul, 2001). However, optimal crop insurance choices for farmers 
differ from those of insurers, who seek to minimize losses. In addition, once farmers buy crop 
insurance, they have a greater incentive to engage in risky behavior; clearly moral hazard can 
  2cause farmers’ and insurers’ interests to diverge. Predictable climate variations may offer an 
opportunity to close this gap.  
Most empirical studies on climate and crop insurance focus on selecting the best insurance 
product for farmers (e.g., Cabrera et al., 2006; Leigh and Kuhnel, 2001; Mjelde, Thompson and 
Nixon, 1996); or have developed parameters for potential new crop insurance products (e.g., 
Turvey, Weersink, and Chiang, 2006; Martin, Barnett and Coble, 2001). Less frequently, 
researchers have taken the viewpoint of the insurer (e.g., Ker and McGowan, 2000). Few articles 
have explored the interaction between farmers and the insurer (e.g, Menrad and Hirzinger, 2005; 
Wang and Zhang, 2003), and none have formally included climate into the analysis. In 
consequence, the current study adds to the literature by offering a dual analysis of the crop 
insurance market in which both farmers’ and insurers’ viewpoints are used to select an optimal 
insurance product. Our hypothesis is that both conflicts and synergies exist between farmers and 
insurers regarding crop insurance selection and that they are influenced largely by climate 
variability.  
To reach our goal we analyze the case of a representative 40 hectares (100 acres), rainfed, 
cotton-peanut farm located in Jackson County, Florida. The Southeastern U.S. offers an 
illustrative setting for studying the interaction of climate variability and crop insurance strategies. 
Several studies have shown that El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a strong driver of 
seasonal climate variability that impacts cotton and peanut crop yields in this geographical area 
(e.g., Hansen, 2002; Jones et al., 2000). In this study we implement biophysical simulation 
models and a stochastic non-linear whole-farm optimization analysis to identify an optimum crop 
insurance product for farmers and insurers based on different scenarios for ENSO. The riskiness 
of the decision strategies is evaluated using a constant relative risk aversion utility function for 
farmers (Letson et al., 2005) and a conditional value-at-risk model for insurers (Rockafellar and 
  3Uryasev, 2002). These results are then contrasted to evaluate the synergies and conflicts between 
the two groups under study.  
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview of the 
recent literature followed by a description of the farmer-insurer synergy-conflict model, the 
methodological framework and a description of the data used. Then, we discuss the empirical 
results and present some concluding remarks.  
 
2.   Literature Review 
Crop insurance is a major component of risk management that farmers could use together 
with climate information to increase and stabilize their incomes. Crop insurance products have 
recently proliferated in the U.S. because of an increased interest in managing income risk by 
farmers, lenders and political leaders (Mahul, 2001; Mjelde, Thompson and Nixon, 1996). 
Farmers now have available multi-peril or actual production history yield insurance products that 
pay based on individual yield shortfalls, area yield insurance products that pay based on county 
yield shortfalls, and revenue insurance products that pay based on individual revenue shortfalls. 
Additionally, premiums charged to farmers, which have historically included a fixed subsidy, 
now have a regressive proportional subsidy that overall is significantly greater. Consequently, 
there is a need to study the potential interactions of climate-based forecasts and crop insurance 
strategies on the stability of farm income. 
As indicated, most empirical studies on this area of research have focused on evaluating 
ways to reduce the farm risk associated with climate variability by selecting the most adequate 
crop insurance products. Among these studies Mjelde, Thompson and Nixon (1996) implemented 
a decision-making framework to introduce crop insurance programs along with climate forecast 
information. Mjelde and Hill (1999) then developed a catastrophic insurance study for corn and 
  4sorghum using utility functions under uncertain weather forecasts. Schneider and Garbrecht 
(2003) and Dalton, Porter and Winslow (2004) claimed that crop insurance programs in the U.S. 
could benefit significantly from using seasonal climate forecasts information. Applying decision 
optimization of the utility function, Cabrera, Letson and Podestá (2007) evaluated the most 
common insurance products for maize, cotton and peanuts in Florida under the uncertainty of 
future weather conditions. Also, Cabrera et al. (2006) developed a model to select the best crop 
insurance products within a whole-farm portfolio framework. In this study the authors evaluated 
all available crop insurance products for cotton and peanuts in Florida and related them with 
information on ENSO phases forecasting and different levels of risk aversion.  
Another group of studies has focused on creating parameters for potential new crop 
insurance products. Along these studies Martin, Barnett and Coble (2001) linked an indemnity 
function with a rain forecast model to develop a precipitation insurance strategy for cotton farms 
in Mississippi. Using random strike prices, Turvey, Weersink and Chiang (2006) developed a 
pricing method for weather insurance for the Ontario ice-wine harvest. Ker and McGowan (2000) 
presented a different approach that deals with adverse selection of crop insurances according to 
ENSO phases. In this model Ker and McGowan optimized the final pay off with respect to the 
insurance agency rather to the farmers.  
Also from the insurer’s point of view, Turvey, Nayak and Sparling (1999) presented a 
model that evaluated insurers’ risk and developed an approach to computing actuarial reinsurance 
premiums. Abbaspour (1994) presented a Bayesian risk methodology to help crop insurers cope 
with uncertainty and risk. Menrad and Hirzinger (2005) compared the impacts of crop insurance 
for insurers and farmers under the scheme of genetically modified plants. Lastly, Wang and 
Zhang (2003) contrasted farmer and insurer perspectives to evaluate the feasibility of non-
  5subsidized, private crop insurance. It is important to highlight that these last group of studies have 
not included climate information in their analysis. 
In sum, most empirical studies dealing with climate variation and crop insurance have 
unidirectionally analyzed this issue, either from the farmers’ or the insurers’ perspective. In this 
paper we propose a more comprehensive analysis by contrasting both viewpoints in the 
assessment of an optimal crop insurance selection process under the influence of climate 
variability. In the following section we conceptualize the farmer-insurer synergies-conflicts 
framework implemented in this article. 
 
3. Conceptual  Framework 
In our synergy-conflict model the farmer and the insurer have different risk reduction 
strategies which are depicted in Figure 1. As shown by arrows a, b, c, and d, synergies and 
conflicts can be found depending on where farm income is located. Figure 1 shows all uncertain, 
but possible income levels that can take place before indemnities from crop insurance is applied. 
Farm income before insurance, which is defined as the crops net revenues less the share cost of 
the insurance premium, can be positive (farm income above the protected threshold), zero (at the 
protected threshold), or negative (below the protected threshold). Conversely, farm income after 
insurance includes indemnity payments when the farm income falls below the protected 
threshold. Thus, in this model there are three possible income zones for the farmers (i.e., gain, 
loss, and maximum loss) and another three zones for the insurer (maximum gain, gain, and loss).
1
[FIGURE 1] 
For instance, if farm income before insurance is positive (i.e., a falls inside the farmer’s 
gain and the insurer’s ‘maximum gain’ area), the situation is of mutual benefit for both the farmer 
and the insurer after insurance (synergy). In this case, the farmer has benefited from the 
  6production, and the insurer has accomplished the maximum gain. The insurer keeps the received 
premium (which includes farmer payments and government subsidies) since s/he does not pay 
any indemnities. 
If farm income before insurance is negative but higher than the protected income (i.e., b 
falls inside the farmer’s ‘loss’ and the insurer’s ‘maximum gain’ area), the situation is of an 
economic loss for the farmer but still a maximum gain for the insurer after insurance (conflict). In 
this area, income is not protected, so the farmer does not receive insurance indemnities, and the 
insurer, as in the previous case, keeps the premium. 
Arrows a and b represent maximum gains for the insurer but uncertain situations of gain 
or loss for the farmer. 
On the other hand, if farm income before insurance is negative and lower than the 
protected income, but higher than the value of the premium received by the insurer (i.e., c falls 
inside the farmer’s ‘maximum loss’ and the insurer’s ‘gain’ area), the situation is of maximum 
possible loss for the farmer and of less gain than the premium for the insurer after insurance 
(conflict). In this area, farm income is protected for the crop insurance contracts, thus the insurer 
pays indemnities to the farmer to reach the farm income insured level. These indemnities however 
have less value than the premium the insurer received. 
Lastly, if farm income before insurance is negative and lower than the value of the 
premium received by the insurer (i.e., d falls inside the farmer’s ‘maximum loss’ and the insurer’s 
‘loss’ area), the situation is of maximum loss for the farmer and also of loss for the insurer 
(conflict). The insurer has to pay a higher value than the received premium as indemnities for the 
farmer to reach the protected level.  
Therefore, arrows c and d represent indifferent situations of maximum loss for the farmer 
and uncertain situations of gain or loss for the insurer.  
  7Hence, income risk strategies are different (though not opposite) for the farmer and the 
insurer. The farmer would seek to maximize gains, while the insurer would seek to minimize 
losses. In this study we evaluate these synergies and/or conflicts of interest by comparing relative 
proportions of farmer’s maximum gains versus insurer’s minimum losses for a crop insurance 
contract under determined ENSO phase and level of risk aversion. We also evaluated these 
synergies and conflicts of interest by calculating loss ratios, which are the indemnity payments 
from the insurer to the farmer expressed as proportion of premium.
 
 
4.  Case Study and Data  
A 40 hectares (100 acres) rainfed farm in Jackson County in Florida that grows 50% 
peanut (Arachis hypogaea L.) and 50% cotton (Gossypium hirsutum L.) in soil type Dothan 
Loamy Sand was used as a case study. This farm was designed taking into account similarities in 
environment, resources and technology to other major agricultural production areas in the 
Southeastern U.S. Thus, our findings can be used as reliable proxies for a broader agricultural 
region.  
Several authors including Hansen (2002), Mavromatis, Jagtap and Jones (2002) and Jones 
et al. (2000) have reported the effect of climate variability due to ENSO on crop yields in Florida. 
ENSO is a climatic phenomenon characterized by changes in the sea surface temperature of the 
Equatorial Pacific Ocean that influences the regional climate. Rainfall is especially sensitive to 
ENSO phases (i.e., El Niño, La Niña and Neutral) in Florida with an average excess near 40% 
during an El Niño year, and with deficit close to 30% during a La Niña year. Temperature is also 
affected by ENSO. Lower (higher) temperatures, especially before planting season, are observed 
during El Niño (La Niña) (Jagtap et al., 2002).   
  8In this study, crop yields for cotton and peanuts were simulated using a suite of 
biophysical simulation models (DSSAT v4.0, Jones et al., 2003) and 65 years of daily weather 
records (1939-2003), which were classified by ENSO phase.
2 Due to the limited weather data 
only a few realizations of ENSO impacts can be obtained. Thus following Cabrera et al. (2006), a 
stochastic generator was used to expand the yield records to 990 cases by ENSO phase to obtain 
more robust results. Table 1 present some descriptive statistics of the of synthetically generated 
crops yields by ENSO phase and planting dates.
3
[TABLE 1] 
To simulate the necessary farm income series, synthetic prices series were generated 
according to Letson et al. (2005). In doing so, several steps were performed. First, monthly 
average prices received by Florida farmers for peanut and cotton were obtained from the USDA 
National Agricultural Statistical Service. The price series, which included data from January 1996 
to January 2005, were deflated to January 2005 dollars using the U.S. Consumer Price Index. In 
addition, this data was de-trended for seasonal differences by estimating monthly residuals with 
respect to their means. Principal Component Analysis was used to decompose the matrix of price 
residuals into three uncorrelated time series of amplitudes that were separately sampled. The 
sampled values were combined and back transformed to reconstruct crop price residuals. The 
Kolgomorov-Smirnov tests confirmed that the correlation structure of the synthetic price residuals 
was similar to that of the historical data and that the historical price distributions were well 
reproduced according to quantile-quantile plots. Finally, seasonal price averages for the 
harvesting dates of the two crops were re-introduced: 2 September - 6 November for peanut and 
22 September - 28 December for cotton. The price distributions obtained with this method do not 
represent historical values, but rather distributions consistent with historical variability.  
  9Contemporary local (variable and fixed) costs of production and labor requirements were 
deterministically incorporated in the model. The data for the two crops were provided by the 
North Florida Research and Education Center in Quincy, Florida. The annual variable costs for 
peanut and cotton are, respectively, $1,088/ha and $1,122/ha. The fixed costs are $344/ha for 
peanut and $177/ha for cotton.  
Lastly, to provide more realistic farm scenarios and to reduce the number of decisions in 
our model, the most common insurance products used by farmers in the Jackson County were 
used in the analysis. Specifically, the studied crop insurance products for peanut and cotton were: 
CAT or Catastrophic coverage; and, 65, 70 and 75%APH or Actual Production History (a.k.a., 
MPCI Multi-Peril Crop Insurance). Additionally, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85%CRC or Crop Revenue 
Coverage were included for cotton. All relevant information about the implemented crop 
insurance products is summarized in Table 2. In this study we diverge from Cabrera et al. (2006) 
in which the premiums received by the insurer included both the government subsidies as well as 
the farmer’s payment. Premiums were computed using the Premium Calculator at the USDA 





  A stochastic non-linear whole-farm model was implemented to select optimal crop 
insurance combinations according to ENSO phases and risk aversion levels. However, the 
implemented model differed between farmer and insurer to account for their own specific 
business goals. The farmer’s case was evaluated by maximizing a constant relative risk aversion 
utility function; whereas, the insurer’s optimal choices were computed using a minimization of 
  10losses framework constrained by a conditional value-at-risk model (CVaR). These techniques are 
discussed in the following subsections. 
 
5.1  Optimal Farm Decisions for the Farmer 
To evaluate the impact of climate information on the farm decision making process and to 
estimate the value of crop insurance choices on farm income, we implemented a stochastic non-
linear whole-farm model. This mathematical programming model was systematically solved to 
identify optimal planting dates and to simulate annual incomes based on the chance of forecasting 
a given phase for ENSO, available crop insurance products, and different levels of risk aversion. 
We assume that climate conditions and crop prices are unknown at the decision time but that their 
historical distributions are known. The model maximized the expected utility (U) at the end of 
one-year planning horizon using the following objective function:
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where: i = ENSO phase (1 = El Niño, 2 = Neutral, 3 = La Niña, 4 = all years);  
  11j = crop (1 = peanut, 2 = cotton);  
m = planting date in Table 1 (1 to 9 for peanut, and 10 to 13 for cotton);  
n = years for each optimization (1 to 990 for El Niño, 991 to 1980 for neutral, 1981 to        
2970 for La Niña, and 1 to 2970 for all years);  
Rr = constant risk aversion coefficient;  
Π = income;  
W0 = initial wealth;  
Wf = final wealth;  
Y = crop yield;  
IY = indemnity yield for insurance purposes (i.e., the compensation a farmer receives to 
cover losses below insured yield levels);  
P = crop price;  
PB = price base for insurance purposes;  
C = production cost;  
Pr = insurance premium; and, 
X = land allocation for every crop planting date. 
  
We assessed the riskiness of the decision strategies by allowing the utility to be a power 
function of wealth, based on a constant relative risk aversion coefficient (Equation 2). Based on 
Hardaker et al. (2004) we considered five possible risk aversion levels: Rr = 0 or risk neutrality; Rr 
= 1 or normal aversion;  Rr = 2 or rather averse; Rr = 3 or very averse; and Rr = 4 or almost 
paranoid.  
 
5.2  Optimal Farm Decisions for the Insurer 
The insurer’s case was also analyzed using a stochastic non-linear whole-farm model. In 
this case, the model was systematically solved to identify optimal planting dates to yield annual 
insurer minimum losses for all combinations of ENSO phases and available crop insurance 
products. As in the farmer’s case, the model assumed the farmer requires selecting at least some 
  12type of insurance contract for each cultivated crop, cotton and peanut, having 50% of the land 
devoted to each crop. This procedure was repeated for each combination of peanut and cotton 
crop insurance product. The model minimized losses (L) for one year planning horizon, using the 
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where:  } , { j m X x λ = v is the decision vector, 
  } , { j j P Y = ξ
v
is the random vector, 
  λj = selection of insurance policy for crop j. 
  
To manage the insurer’s risk levels within this framework we implemented a CVaR model 
(Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2002).
5 CVaR is a financial adaptation of the chance-constrained 
programming for stochastic optimization models (Prekopa, 1995; Charnes and Cooper, 1959) 
developed to hedging a portfolio of financial instruments (crop insurances in our case) to reduce 
risk. In doing so, the objective to minimize loss returns (L) is constrained under a CVaR 
(Equation 7), so as the insurer can control the risk (α) associated to a combination of insurance 
contracts to reach a loss inside a defined range (v).
6
Both optimization models (i.e., farmer’ and insurer’s models) were solved using the 
MINOS5 algorithm in GAMS (Gill et al., 2000) along with a randomized procedure to alter 
starting values and assure global maxima solutions. 
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6.  Results and Discussion 
6.1 Farmer’s  Best Performing Crop Insurance Combinations  
Table 3 presents the farmer’s best performing crop insurance combinations under different 
risk aversion levels. These crop insurance combinations were selected based on the estimated 
farm incomes for a single 990-year planning horizon. As expected, the yearly average predicted 
income decreased with increased risk aversion levels. In addition, a comparison of farm income 
between the ENSO phases and ‘all years’ shows that the latter displays statistically lower average 
incomes than the ENSO phases. However, no statistically significant differences were found 
between El Niño and La Niña years.
7 Lower incomes for ‘all years’ are expected since this group 
did not include climate forecasts information in its farm decisions framework. The income 
difference between any ENSO phase and ‘all years’ could be considered as the added value of 
using climatic information. 
[TABLE 3] 
The empirical results show that, independently of the ENSO phase, higher incomes were 
simulated for low or no insurance coverage for cotton combined with high coverage for peanut. 
The highest income was obtained during El Niño years with the no insurance option for cotton 
and 75%APH for peanut (average=$18,265/year and CI(95%)=[17,027-19,502]). The lowest   
income was obtained for Neutral years when the 85%CRC coverage was selected for cotton and 
no insurance was selected for peanut (average=$12,947 and CI(95%)=[11,741-14,154]).  
As indicated above, differences were also found depending on the farmer’s risk aversion 
level. For low risk adverse level (Rr = 0 and 1), the optimization analysis showed the same best 
crop insurance combinations across ENSO phases. The analysis suggests that under risk neutral 
  14(Rr = 0) and normal (Rr = 1) risk aversion levels, the best crop insurance combination are no 
coverage or CAT coverage for cotton and 65 to 75% APH for peanut.  
For higher risk aversion levels (Rr = 2, 3 and 4) the five top crop insurance combinations 
differed across ENSO phases and risk aversion levels. For cotton, although no insurance and CAT 
coverage were maintained as one of the best insurance combinations, higher coverage levels, such 
as 65 and 70%CRC for El Niño years and 65 to 75%CRC for La Niña years, were also included. 
For peanut, however, lower coverage levels were selected such as no insurance and 65%APH for 
El Niño years; no insurance, 65 to 75%APH for Neutral years, and 70%APH for La Niña years. 
Crop insurance coverage is just one of the ways that farmer can reduce exposure to risk. Peanut is 
fairly resistant to changes in the extremes of its yield variability, and major impacts in production 
due to diseases and nematodes can be managed at a lower cost than the insurance premium. We 
expect the more risk averse decision maker to hedge, but not necessarily by buying more crop 
insurance. The trade off is increased financial risk versus reduced production risk. The risk 
adverse farmer would find for the case of peanut that the cost of insurance premium is more risky 
than the additional protection provided by the insurance.  
 
6.2 Insurer’s  Best Performing Crop Insurance Combinations  
The optimization analysis for the insurer shows average gains ranging from $23 to $258 
ha/year. Minimum gain occurred for a contract CAT for cotton and 70%APH for peanut for La 
Niña and El Niño years, whereas this was CAT for cotton and peanut for Neutral years. 
Maximum gain occurred for 85%CRC for cotton and 75%APH for peanut for La Niña and 
Neutral years, whereas 85%CRC for cotton and 65%APH for peanut gave the maximum gain for 
El Niño years. Figure 2 summarizes the average gains by insurance contracts and ENSO phase. 
The lines cross over in several points indicating different climate impacts by insurance contract.  
  15[FIGURE 2] 
Table 4 shows the crop insurance contracts with maximum gains that 90, 95, or 99% of 
the time (risk level) have more gain than a value (risk value). The contract 85%CRC-65%APH 
was the best for El Niño years, however if the insurer wants to have higher than $4,000 of gain 
(or $100/ha) 95% of the time, 75%APH-CAT would be the best contract. Likewise, the best 
contract for El Niño years to have 99% of the time higher than $2,000 (or $50/ha) would be 75% 
APH-CAT. There was no contract available that 99% of the time had a gain greater than $4,000. 
[TABLE 4] 
 
6.3  Synergies and Conflicts between Farmer and Insurer 
Figure 3 combines the farmer net income and the insurer gains, both expressed as 
percentages of their maximums, by ENSO phase and crop insurance contract. Following the 
model presented in Section 3, synergies between insurer and farmer can be found in areas where 
percentages of insurer gain and farmer net income are alike.  Considering the 40 to 60% interval a 
reasonable range where insurer and farmer would converge in their interests, it is possible to find 
out some synergic crop insurance alternatives. Specifically, the synergic crop insurances are: 
75%APH-75%APH and 75%CRC-CAT for all ENSO phases; 75%APH-CAT for Neutral and La 
Niña; 75%APH-70%APH for El Niño; and 80%CRC-70%APH and 75%APH-65%APH for 
Neutral.  Neutral years had five synergetic contracts, whereas El Niño and La Niña only had 
three. 
[FIGURE 3] 
The greater conflict of interest between insurer and farmer occurred at the extremes of the 
graphs in Figure 3. The contract 85%CRC-CAT was the lowest net income generator for the 
farmer while it brought one of the greatest gains to the insurer. Likewise, contracts such as CAT-
  1675%APH for El Niño and Neutral and CAT-70%APH for La Niña had the highest net incomes 
for the farmer with the lowest gains for the insurer.  
 
6.4  Insurer Loss Ratios by Optimal Crop Insurance Contracts 
Lastly, we discuss the insurer loss ratios obtained under optimal crop insurance contracts 
presented earlier. Generally speaking, a loss ratio corresponds to what an insurer spends to pay 
the claims of its customers, expressed as a percentage of its premium. The loss ratio is a fair 
measure of the value of an insurance product from a consumer perspective. The empirical results 
show that the average loss ratio for all years was 0.32, indicating that only 32% of the premium 
received was used to pay indemnities. This ratio decreased when using climate information to 
0.27 for El Niño, 0.30 for Neutral, and 0.26 for La Niña suggesting that the value of the climatic 
information has a greater significance for insurers than for farmers. Figure 4 shows the average 
loss ratio by insurance contract and ENSO phase. The lowest loss ratios occurred for 65, 70, and 
75%APH for cotton and CAT for peanut contracts during La Niña; and 75%APH-CAT contracts 
during El Niño and Neutral. The highest ratios occurred for CAT-75%APH for El Niño, 
65%CRC-70%APH for Neutral, and CAT-70%APH during La Niña. 
[FIGURE 4] 
  The results presented above are far from the 1.075 long-run loss ratio targeted by the 
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) in 2005.
8 No insurance contract reached on average a 
loss ratio between 1 (indemnity is equal to premium) and 1.075 (7.5% beyond premium loss). 
However, Figure 5 shows that most of the contracts had a number of realizations that reached 
such a target loss ratio. There was great variability in such frequency influenced primary by 
climate variability. Depending on ENSO phase, the frequency varied from zero (75%APH-
  1775%APH and 80%CRC-CAT contracts) to 65 in Neutral years (65%CRC-75%APH), to 54 in El 
Niño years (75%CRC-75%APH), and to 43 in La Niña years (65%CRC-65%APH). 
[FIGURE 5] 
  Climate variability had a great impact on the farmer income and insurer gain, impacting 
also the overall loss ratio and the probability to reach the target loss ratio. This climatic impact 
was noticed be the highest for the 65%CRC-75%APH contract that had 41% higher (neutral) and 
55% lower (El Niño and La Niña) probabilities of being in the target loss ration than ‘all years.’ 
Insurance policies within the FCIC targeted loss ratio may increase the range of synergic crop 
insurance alternatives improving expected farmers’ returns. This is an area that merits further 
research.  
 
7.  Concluding remarks  
This study analyzed the potential synergies and conflicts of interest between farmers and 
insurers in the selection of an optimal crop insurance contract in the presence of climate 
variability. Our results show that farmer’s income is significantly affected by the crop insurance 
policy purchased and the risk aversion level selected. Long-run gains for insurers are directly 
related to the premium received and risk levels. In addition, year-to-year, ENSO-based climate 
variability affected farmer income and insurer gains according to crop insurance contracts. 
While we did find evidence of conflicting interests between insurers and farmers 
regarding crop insurance selection, their best choices are seldom contradictory. So, if both parties 
are willing to show flexibility regarding their best selections, farmers and insurers can both attain 
long term sustainability without jeopardizing their economic stability. However, only the insurer 
has the capacity to change the underwritten crop insurance policy contracts under the 
commitment to help farmers attain economic stability. Therefore, the insurer would have a greater 
  18ability to resolve these conflicts of interests. Using ENSO-based climate forecast would be a 
critical factor on this decision selection process. 
Another important outcome is that average loss ratio found for insures was 0.32; that is, 
only 32% of the premium received was used to pay indemnities. This ratio is significantly lower 
than the 1.075 long-run ratio targeted by policy makers; suggesting that for the region and crops 
considered significant room exists for decreasing subsidies and/or decreasing farmers’ premium, 
while still attaining economically feasible loss ratio targets. 
In sum, the results of this study agree with the spirit of Changnon, Fosse and Lecomte 
(1999) who suggest that usable and timely climate information can help farmers and insurers to 
mitigate losses related to climate variability. Climate information can help farmers to select a 
better planting window and to establish production strategies that maximize their incomes. In 
addition, this kind of information may assist insurers to assess risks more precisely. Thus, insurers 
and farmers can bridge their divergent interests by improving their understanding of the effect of 
climate conditions on the development of sustainable business plans.  
Although this study has focused on presenting an analysis with great farm-level detail and 
a large temporal data distribution, the spatial dimension was omitted. Consequently, studying the 
value of location on the impact of climate and crop insurance on farm income could be an area for 
future refinement of the model implemented here. 
 
  19Footnotes 
1 Our framework may not be a good approximation for some particular federal farm programs in 
which crop insurance products have been developed without taking into account the insurer 
losses. However, long-term sustainability of crop insurance programs will require maintaining 
those losses to a manageable level. Thus, optimizing insurers losses would help in reaching this 
goal.  
2 The climate information was collected from the weather station at Chipley, Florida. 
Additionally, the JMA (1991) definition of ENSO events was used to sort the climate data. 
3 It is important to indicate that our simulated yields are consistent with previous research in 
Florida (e.g., Hansen, Hodges and Jones, 1998; Mavromatis, Jagtap and Jones, 2002; among 
others). 
4 Ongoing farm policy discussions may affect commodity prices and crop insurance contracts. For 
example, cotton export subsidies could be reduced or eliminated, due to international trade 
negotiations (USTR, 2006). If so, domestic cotton prices may decline and become more 
volatile, which in turn may trigger more expensive insurance contracts. Thus, the optimum 
selection of insurance contract may be affected not only by the new insurance premiums, which 
are also likely to be redefined in the new 2007 Farm Bill, but also by commodity prices and risk 
preferences. Nevertheless, the framework implemented in this paper holds valid in analyzing 
synergies and conflicts between farmers and insurers in future venues.  
5 Different risk levels are included in this analysis to control for climate uncertainty and for 
uncertainty about the honesty of the insured (Moral Hazard). 
6 A detailed mathematical derivation of the CVaR model in agriculture can be found in Liu et al. 
(2006). 
7 Independent t-tests (α=0.05) were used to compare the average farm income. 
8 The local insurer’s loss ratios reported in this paper consider only two crops in one county and 
are not intended for evaluating the whole U.S. insurance market. To do so, further analysis 
including a broader spatial a dimension is needed.   
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  23Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Synthetic Yields by Crops and Planting Date 
 
    Synthetic yields (kg/ha) 
Crop  Planting date  All Years    El Niño 
  Neutral  La  Niña 
      Mean  SD    Mean  SD 
  Mean SD   Mean SD 
Peanut  16  April  3,078 1,275   2,918 1,308 
  3,261 1,507   3,055  916 
  23  April  3,150 1,276   3,077 1,339 
  3,151 1,471   3,221  961 
   1  May  3,217 1,272   3,150 1,232 
  3,202 1,474   3,298 1,076 
   8  May  3,332 1,318   3,303 1,235 
  3,338 1,430   3,356 1,282 
   15  May  3,360 1,225   3,313 1,146 
  3,278 1,257   3,489 1,260 
   22  May  3,361 1,210   3,390 1,064 
  3,352 1,248   3,341 1,305 
   29  May  3,373 1,266   3,402 1,224 
  3,371 1,201   3,346 1,368 
   5  June  3,341 1,327   3,440 1,389 
  3,288 1,238   3,296 1,344 
   12  June  2,956 1,477   3,008 1,613 
  2,982 1,376   2,877 1,429 
                     
Cotton  16  April  720 78    720 78 
  729 84    711 69 
  23  April  717 81    707 79 
  736 80    709 81 
   1  May  714 84    699 89 
  733 70    711 89 
  8 May  715  76     696  60 
   727 72      722 89 
                     
 Number of observations  2,970     990  
  990     990  
Note: Planting dates are based on stand agricultural practices in the Southeastern U.S. 
 
  24Table 2. Crop insurance policies, coverage levels, premium prices,  
and average yields used in the farm model analysis 
 
 Peanut  Cotton 
APH coverage range (5% increments)  65 - 75%  65 - 75% 
CRC coverage range (5% increments)  --  65 - 85% 
Price Base 2004 ($/kg)  0.393 1.499 
APH Premium Range  2004 ($/ha)  9.64 - 41.27  21.50 - 93.90 
CRC Premium Range 2004 ($/ha)  --  27.18 - 288.87 
Average yield (Ton/ha)  3.362 0.729 
 
Note: APH is yield and CRC is income coverage. 
 
Source: USDA Risk Management Agency  
  25Table 3. Farmer’s best crop insurance combinations according to average incomes by 
ENSO phase and level of risk aversion. 
 
  El Niño    Neutral    La Niña  Level of Risk 
Aversion 
(Rr)    Insurance 
(Cotton – Peanut) 
Average 
Income 
($ / yr) 
  Insurance 
(Cotton – Peanut) 
Average 
Income 
($ / yr) 
  Insurance 
(Cotton – Peanut) 
Average 
Income 
($ / yr) 
                
 NOINS-75APH  18,265   NOINS-75APH  17,641   NOINS-75APH  18,022 
 CAT-75APH 18,235   CAT-75APH 17,611    CAT-75APH 17,992 
 NOINS-70APH  18,148   NOINS-70APH  17,482   NOINS-70APH  17,951 



















 NOINS-65APH  17,943   NOINS-65APH  17,231   NOINS-65APH  17,791 
                
 NOINS-75APH  17,561   NOINS-75APH  17,085   NOINS-75APH  17,346 
 CAT-75APH 17,530   CAT-75APH 17,054    CAT-75APH 17,317 
 NOINS-70APH  17,420   NOINS-70APH  16,887   NOINS-70APH  17,246 
























 NOINS-65APH  17,205   NOINS-65APH  16,653   NOINS-65APH  17,068 
                
 CAT-65APH 15,553   CAT-70APH 15,543    NOINS-70APH  15,086 
 NOINS-65APH  15,356    CAT-65APH 15,213    CAT-70APH 15,028 
 NOINS-NOINS 15,215   NOINS-65APH 15,066    65CRC-70APH 14,806 

















 CAT-NOINS  14,966   CAT-NOINS 14,841    70APH-70APH  14,144 
                
 CAT-65APH 14,905   CAT-70APH 14,768    NOINS-70APH  14,452 
 NOINS-65APH  14,713    CAT-65APH 14,407    CAT-70APH 14,392 
 NOINS-NOINS 14,391    CAT-75APH 14,330    65CRC-70APH  14,202 















 65CRC-65APH  14,219    CAT-NOINS 14,089    70APH-70APH  13,506 
                
 CAT-65APH 14,276   CAT-70APH 14,016    NOINS-70APH  13,832 
 NOINS-65APH  14,089    CAT-75APH 13,731    CAT-70APH 13,772 
 70CRC-65APH  13,770    CAT-65APH 13,625    65CRC-70APH  13,613 




















 NOINS-NOINS 13,587    CAT-NOINS 13,355    75CRC-70APH  12,894 
 
Note: Insurance is cotton-peanut insurance combination; CRC is crop revenue coverage; APH is actual 














  26Table 4. Insurer’s best crop insurance contract according to 
risk values and risk levels 
 
       Risk Level    
  Risk Value  90%  95%  99% 
<-4000 85CRC-65APH  85CRC-65APH  85CRC-65APH 
-4000-2000 85CRC-65APH  85CRC-65APH  85CRC-65APH 
-2000-0 85CRC-65APH  85CRC-65APH  85CRC-65APH 
0-2000 85CRC-65APH  85CRC-65APH  85CRC-65APH 









>4000 85CRC-65APH  75APH-CAT NA 
        
<-4000 85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH 
-4000-2000 85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH 
-2000-0 85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH 
0-2000  85CRC-75APH 85CRC-75APH 65APH-CAT 









>4000 85CRC-75APH  75APH-CAT NA 
        
<-4000 85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH 
-4000-2000 85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH 
-2000-0  85CRC-75APH 85CRC-75APH 85CRC-CAT 
0-2000  85CRC-75APH 85CRC-75APH 70APH-CAT 









>4000 85CRC-CAT  85CRC-CAT  NA 
        
<-4000 85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH 
-4000-2000 85CRC-75APH  85CRC-75APH 75APH-65APH 
-2000-0  85CRC-75APH 85CRC-75APH 65APH-CAT 
0-2000  85CRC-75APH 85CRC-75APH 75APH-CAT 











>4000 85CRC-CAT  NA  NA 
 
Note:  NA means not available insurance contract for those conditions. Crop 
insurance contracts (%) are for cotton-peanut combinations. 
  27Figure 1. Gains, losses, and risk strategies in determining the best  


















































Note: upside arrows identify farm incomes and downside arrows represent 
indemnity payments. 
  28Figure 2. Average gain of insurer per crop insurance contract 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































  Cotton-Peanut Insurance Policy 
 
 
Note: Crop insurance contracts (%) are for cotton-peanut combinations 
  29Figure 3. Insurer gain and farmer net income expressed by percentage of their 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cotton-Peanut Insurance Policy 
 
 













































































































































































































































































































































































































  31Figure 5. Frequency or number of times the loss ratio was between 1 and 1.075 per 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cotton-Peanut Insurance Policy 
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